EXHIBIT B

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

In the matter of:

RAYMOND B. FARMER and DIANE P.)
FARMER,

Debtors.

Case No. 10-40269

Debtors.

JOSHUA B. FARMER and ANDREA
G. FARMER,

Debtors.

Charlotte, NC
May 12, 2010, 9:43 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE R. HODGES
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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1 THE COURT: In the Farmer matters, why don't we just 2 start with Ms. Simpson and go across the room that way. 3 MS. SIMPSON: Linda Simpson, Bankruptcy Administrator. 4 MR. HOUSTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Andy Houston and Richard Wright on behalf of the debtors, Raymond and Diane 5 6 Farmer, Josh and Andrea Farmer. 7 MR. PEARCE: Your Honor, Brad Pearce on behalf of 8 Inland Mortgage Capital Corporation. 9 MR. ESSER: Your Honor, Will Esser on behalf of 10 Palmetto Bank. And appearing with me today, I would like to 11 introduce to the court my colleague, Katie Trotter, who was a clerk for Judge Leonard and has come back to us from a stint in 12 1.3 New York. 14 THE COURT: Good. 15 MS. CRABTREE: Your Honor, Hillary Crabtree. representing South Carolina Electric and Gas and Public Service 16 17 of North Carolina, Inc. MR. PULLIAM: Your Honor, Jim Pulliam, appearing on 18 behalf of 1230 Overbrook Drive Holdings, LLC, CBA-Mezzanine 19 20 Capital Finance, LLC, US Bank in its capacity as trustee for 21 registered holders of MLCFC and US Bank in its capacity as 22 trustee for Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C5. 23 MS. WHITE: Your Honor, Heather White appearing on 24 behalf of Easlan Property Management Group. 25 MR. SPENCER: Your Honor, Louis Spencer on behalf of

First National Bank of Charlotte.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I guess we have got a couple of things on. Does anybody have any ideas of what we ought to do first?

MR. ESSER: Well, Your Honor, I think that procedurally we have a motion from Palmetto Bank to determine the applicable law which will apply in this case. I think that's in conjunction with the court's sua sponte putting this on with regard to the single-asset real estate rules.

And, Your Honor, I think maybe to start with is giving a summary of where we are in this case. I don't believe that there are any facts which are in dispute before the court today.

The debtor, Mr. Joshua Farmer, has twice now testified both here in the court, as well as in his 2004 examination, regarding these prepetition transfers which occurred. The court has heard about that extensively. It is undisputed that there were - the reasons why it was done. Mr. Farmer has not tried to hide those reasons. He has been fairly forthright about the fact that he, you know, met with Max Gardner and Tom Moon prior to filing this bankruptcy and came up with this strategy for two reasons. One, to avoid having to file multiple separate corporate actions and the second being to try to avoid the absolute priority rule. Twice under oath Mr. Farmer has testified that those are the only two reasons for

having done these transfers.

I think it is also clear, Your Honor, that Mr. Farmer has testified that there was no consideration given. The bills of sale and the quitclaim deeds recite that there was, I think, ten dollars of consideration and assumption of debt. Mr. Farmer testified in his 2004 examination that the ten dollars was just stated in the documents but no ten dollars ever transferred hands. So that leaves us with this assumption of debt.

With regard to all of the secured debt, Your Honor, that was already guaranteed by Mr. Farmer and Raymond Farmer. So there was no benefit given to the various LLCs and, in fact, it is uncontroverted that the various LLCs did not receive any kind of releases and, to this day, remain liable on all of their various debts which were allegedly assumed.

Your Honor, with regard to the issue that Palmetto has raised in its brief with regard to the fact that all of these transfers were void as fraudulent transfers, I don't want to overstate our position on that. We think that ultimately the facts as laid out are incontrovertible and they clearly establish that all of those transfers were void as a matter of South Carolina state law.

That being said, when I filed the motion for Palmetto,
I simply had stated in the motion itself that Palmetto was
reserving its right with regard to that issue. As I went

forward on briefing, however, it became clear that the white elephant in the room which needed to be addressed was are these properties property of the estate or are these properties not property of the estate, but that clearly was the overriding issue that needed to be addressed by the court.

Now, Palmetto is happy to admit or, excuse me, will readily admit that there are some cases which hold that the question of what is or is not property of the estate, that that issue is properly raised in an adversary proceeding.

Now, that being said, Your Honor, Palmetto believes that in this circumstance there is no need for an adversary proceeding. Palmetto doesn't believe it needs to take any discovery, the debtor doesn't need to take any discovery. We are willing to move for summary judgment on this issue with regard to solely based upon the testimony which has been presented already.

Now, if the debtors can articulate an advantage or a reason or some benefit that they would obtain through having this issue obtained in an adversary proceeding, some benefit other than solely delay, then I would like to hear what that is. But ultimately, Your Honor, if you believe an adversary proceeding is necessary on the fraudulent transfer issue, Palmetto will immediately file one and we would simply ask that the court, under Rule 9006(c), require the debtors to expeditiously answer the complaint, say no more than fourteen

days to respond, because there really aren't any factual issues to be addressed, and then immediately allow Palmetto to go ahead and have the matter heard on summary judgment. That would put it into the kind of procedural context which the debtors apparently would like on the fraudulent transfer issue.

With regard to the other two issues which are before the court, with regard to the single asset real estate issue, Your Honor, which you raised sua sponte, it's a little bit problematic or difficult to try to fit what is somewhat of a square peg into a round hole. That is, to take a rule which would apply to a corporate debtor and try to apply it to an individual debtor. We acknowledge that. That's a situation which the debtors themselves have created and which they call, therefore, unorthodox.

Your Honor, I think that the court can easily address that issue, however, by simply entering an order which says unless the debtors start to make the required payments to the lenders, or have filed a plan of reorganization within ninety days, then the court will find the lenders do not have adequate protection and therefore there is cause for relief from stay under 362(d)(1).

I think using that kind of a road map avoids any of the problems of trying to apply, quote, single-asset real estate rules in an individual case but really applies justice and fairness because that is what exactly would apply but for

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the debtor's inappropriate stratagem to avoid the Bankruptcy Code.

The same thing, I think, Your Honor, applies with regard to the absolute priority rule. If these cases had been filed as corporate cases, which they should have been, then there is no question but that the absolute priority rule would I think that the way Your Honor could address that issue today is to simply say, well, if the debtor tries to keep equity in the properties without paying creditors less than a hundred percent on the dollar, that the court would find that any such plan fails to meet the requirements of 1129(a)(3) for good faith and therefore there is no problem about applying you know, that clearly applies whether the case is individual or a corporate case, but it also essentially achieves the same substance, which is that the debtors should not be allowed to come up with a clever strategy to try to avoid what Congress has said is the law with regard to bankruptcy debtors.

So for those reasons, Your Honor, we would ask that both the single-asset real estate and absolute priority rules would apply in the manner in which Palmetto, as I have just stated, and that with regard to the fraudulent transfer issue, if the court doesn't rule on it today, that we set up, the court allow an adversary proceeding with very shortened time lines so that we can get this matter to summary judgment very

quickly.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else?

MR. HOUSTON: Your Honor, Andy Houston on behalf of the debtor, and I think what Your Honor asked is if anybody had any ideas as to how to deal with the multiple motions that are on, and I guess we are addressing the single-asset argument right now.

Starting off, Your Honor, I would just like to sort of re-focus the court as to what was properly before it today. Starting with at the hearing on the 12th or the 28th, Your Honor requested that parties either submit some kind of argument as to whether the single-asset rule should apply or whether Your Honor should do it on his own motion. After some discussion, Your Honor agreed that the parties could brief and argue the issue, and that is really the only issue that I believe is properly before the court.

I acknowledge that Palmetto Bank filed a motion slightly expanding the scope of what Your Honor had requested shortly after the hearing, and then I acknowledged that Palmetto Bank filed a brief five days ago drastically expanding the scope of what Your Honor had requested a hearing on, including containing arguments regarding whether these transfers were void as fraudulent transfers under South Carolina law, as well as certain other arguments. That they should be granted relief from stay, I believe was one of them,

as well as dismissing the case.

The issues we are prepared to address today are single-asset rules and specifically 362(d)(3) which, as Mr. Esser mentioned, is essentially a ninety-day rule and that the debtors have to commence making interest payments at the non-default contract rate on the value of the lender's collateral or the debtor has to file a plan within the ninety days.

As to whether it should apply in this case, the debtors submit that 362(d)(3) does not actually fit in this case, and I believe Mr. Esser made a very good analogy that it's like sticking a square peg in a round hole. The definition is set forth in section 101, and I think we all agree that the essential elements to show whether a case is a single-asset case is whether the debtor owns real property constituting one property or project; two, whether all of the debtor's or substantially all of the debtor's gross income comes from the operation of that project; and, three, whether there is any other substantial business being conducted on that one property or project.

I think it is pretty clear that the case doesn't technically fit a single-asset case. The debtors are individual debtors. They own multiple properties currently. Substantially all of their income is not derived from the operation of these properties. In fact, both Josh and Andrea Farmer are practicing attorneys. Andrea full-time and Josh

less so. Ray Farmer owns a construction business, and I believe his wife is a part-time teacher.

In terms of whether substantial business is operated other than just the operation of the real estate and actions incidental thereto, this really is an enterprise. I mean, there are managers portfolio wide, a gentleman named Andy Kidd. There are a number of other employees who provide services portfolio wide as opposed to this just being the situation where you have got the debtor and one piece of real estate or one project.

In addition, I would submit that I don't believe that there is any harm to the lenders in not treating this case as a single-asset case. And, by that, I mean the lenders on one hand, if these cases were filed individually, would have had secured claims to the value of their collateral and, if they are filed in individual cases, probably some kind of nominal dividend would be paid on their unsecured claims. And I believe, in this case, they are actually going to be benefitted by the fact that there is this operating enterprise which has a wider base of assets that they would be allowed to increase the dividend on the unsecured portions of their claim, which is probably going to be the large chunk of unsecured claims in this case.

Your Honor, I understand this is certainly an unorthodox case. We have acknowledged as much before. Mr.

Farmer testified to as much. What do you do? The answer is, if Your Honor is inclined to apply the single-asset rules, we believe that, if you are going to apply them, that we would request that you apply them to those properties which would have been single-asset cases absent the prepetition transfers.

In our motion and the brief, we filed a chart and I believe six of the properties probably would have been single-asset cases. I think it's three properties that were pledged to Palmetto Bank; one property was pledged to Inland; one that's pledged to - it's Timber Creek. I believe it's Key Bank. And then the Georgetown property. I think it is those six. The other properties, I do not believe to be single-asset cases.

And if Your Honor is inclined to apply the rules to those, we would also request that Your Honor enter some kind of limiting order preventing those lenders from not sharing in essentially the other pool of assets. For instance, any of these unencumbered assets which could potentially increase the dividend that they would have received. So we would request that they do not receive anything more than they would have received if this case had been filed as a single-asset case with respect to their properties.

The second issue is the absolute priority rule and, Your Honor, I have basically two thoughts on this. The first being that I am not sure that the court needs to decide whether

the absolute priority rule applies now. It seems to me that it is more of a confirmation fight than anything else. And if Your Honor is inclined to hear argument on that today, then I would submit the absolute priority rule does not apply in individual cases.

And in coming to that determination, you have to look at the purpose and history behind the absolute priority rule, and I think the general purpose behind the absolute priority rule is to prevent equity holders in corporate cases from obtaining their interest, obtaining value when the unsecured creditors are not paid in full.

Historically speaking, it is something that has not worked well in individual cases, and my understanding is that, pre 2005, the absolute priority rule applied in individual Chapter 11 cases and it was in many regards unworkable and, in response to those problems, Congress enacted BAPCPA in 2005, which essentially changed the absolute priority rule and it did not apply to individual cases, and a number of cases interpreting that — in fact, I am not aware of any that have not interpreted it as stating that the absolute priority rule does not apply in individual cases.

You know, I think the reasoning behind that is that it is just something that is very antithetical to the nature of an individual case in that there are no shareholders in an individual case. And I think Congress responded to that by

enacting section 1129(a) (15) talking about projected disposable income in an attempt to make individual Chapter 11 cases look more like Chapter 13 cases.

And I think this is the point to be made, is that Palmetto has consistently harped on the fact that Mr. Farmer considered the absolute priority rule prior to this what we have referred to as the roll-up prepetition. And while that is certainly their opinion, it seems to ignore fact and be based on the erroneous assumption that Congress intended that individual debtors get some kind of get out of jail free card by filing an individual eleven.

You know, frankly it doesn't seem to work that the absolute priority rule would apply in an individual case and, in lieu of that, Congress has allowed debtors, when an unsecured creditor objects, it allows debtors to - requires debtors to commit all of their projected disposable income to fund the plan.

And I should also point out that, to the extent that there are any of these properties, and probably not the apartment complexes so much, but any of these other properties that have equity, the debtors would have to buy back that equity essentially to tender to the unsecured creditors to satisfy the best interest test. So I am not sure that the lenders would be any worse off with this treatment.

Moving on, Your Honor, to the extent that the court

wants to entertain the fraudulent transfer arguments, I think there are really a number of reasons, and clearly there are factual disputes, and I could just gloss over them, whether there was consideration paid or not, you know, whether these were property of the estate. I don't believe that Mr. Esser has made any kind of showing for some kind of expedited adversary proceeding. I don't believe these issues are properly before the court.

And if you are looking for a reason why this should actually be determined in an adversary proceeding, if that's where we need to go, is I am not sure these were fraudulent transfers under South Carolina law. And if I can approach the bench, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOUSTON: Along those lines, Your Honor, I would submit to you the case of Leasing Enterprises v. Goodman, and if I could just take a brief minute about this case. In the Leasing Enterprises case, Leasing Enterprises leased equipment to Mr. Goodman. Mr. Goodman and Mrs. Goodman were guarantors of that obligation. Mr. Goodman filed for bankruptcy - do you want me to -

THE COURT: Yeah, let me just ask you all to stand down for a minute.

(Recess from 10:02 a.m. until 10:16 a.m. while the court heard matters in unrelated cases.)

THE COURT: Okay. Back to the Farmer matter. I guess I should say that I don't think the fraudulent transfer issue is properly before us today. And on the absolute priority rule, I think that that is best left to dealing with that in conjunction with a plan or confirmation of a plan.

I have confirmed a plan that violated the absolute priority rule but I got reversed for that. I only did that because Mr. Henson dared me to, but I will try not to do that again. But I think that is an issue that should be dealt with at confirmation rather than give what would essentially be an advisory opinion at this point.

It is a serious matter and, as I say, we can't confirm a plan that does violate the actual priority rule. So I will let you all deal with that.

So I think the main thing we need to consider today is application of the single-asset rules. I cut you off with the phone call. Is there anything -

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HOUSTON: Your Honor, in light of your comments, I am inclined not to actually say any more on this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else? Mr. Pearce, you were standing up a minute ago.

MR. PEARCE: Your Honor, I will take exception. I don't think the single-asset real estate rule of 362(d)(3) is difficult to apply in this case. It applies to the property and to the related secured debt, and it certainly gives the

debtors the opportunity to propose a plan within ninety days in lieu of making payments.

The one issue is with respect to the payment option. If there is not a plan that has a reasonable chance of being confirmed filed within ninety days, then I would just propose, as opposed to running back to court or running back-and-forth with multiple fights, that the payments be established at a minimum at the contract, non-default rate, at the amount listed by the debtors in the schedules. And of course every creditor would be free to come in and challenge the valuation of its interest in the property securing its loan.

Mr. Houston suggested a limitation which I believe related to payments under the plan. I believe that's premature. Also I would like to point out that, at least with respect to the debt owed to Inland, we have complete payment guaranties from Joshua and Raymond Farmer and limited payment guaranties from Diane and Andrea Farmer. So that kind of limitation would be circumventing any contrary to the prebankruptcy contractual obligations of the debtors.

I really don't think it is that difficult to apply in this case, and I think equity does say that it should apply, notwithstanding the various fights we have had about whether there is a fraudulent transfer, whether the matter is properly before the court to find a fraudulent transfer. We did have transfers of the assets from the LLCs immediately prior to

bankruptcy in violation, at least in my case, of covenants of the LLCs and of agreements signed by the Farmers individually. I don't think it is a big stretch for the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in this case to apply the single-asset real estate rules for those six properties and certainly to the Groves Apartments.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else? Ms. Simpson.

MS. SIMPSON: Your Honor, I disagree a little bit on the administrative end of it. I think, if you are going to require one of these complexes to be a single-asset real estate entity, then you split it out entirely as if it was a separate entity. I think we split out the creditors of that entity. I think we split out the assets, whatever they happen to be, including potential tax attributes of those entities. I don't know if the net operating loss carry forward, anything like that, but I think you do split them out entirely.

So in that sense, there is a little more administration to it if Your Honor decides to treat them as such.

MR. ESSER: Your Honor, to echo what Ms. Simpson said, I think that that would actually be somewhat of an ideal solution if the court were to just treat these as all split out. I mean, one of the things that hasn't really been addressed as much is the fact that, if these are all treated separately, the pool of claimants for the particular property

and therefore the pool of claimants who will vote on a plan with regard to that property is much narrower. I mean, I think the court could probably get a pretty good sense the very first day we were in here. All of the lenders were over here arguing with the exception of Mr. Henderson was over here. And guess who their impaired class of creditors to cram down everybody else is going to be? I mean, that became clear on the very first day.

So if we go ahead and treat it the way that it should have been treated, the way the creditors intended it to be treated, the way it was set up until five days before the bankruptcy plan, all of these would be treated separately.

Now, we don't want to insist that the debtors have to file separate cases and bear the various administrative expenses but, if the court were to rule that all of these single assets would be put into separate buckets and the plan is going to have to treat them with separate buckets, then I think that that would be an appropriate resolution to dealing with this.

If the court is not ready to do this, at least I think the court could have the road map on proceeding forward of simply finding, under 362(d)(1), that cause exists for relief from stay if the debtor does not start making those payments or file a plan within the ninety days.

THE COURT: Anybody else?

(No response.)

THE COURT: It is remarkably silent. Anything else, Mr. Houston?

MR. HOUSTON: I don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think I should apply the single-asset rules to the six properties that would have been single assets, and I think the issues is not whether the case now qualifies as a single-asset case but the issue is really what parts of it would have qualified as a single-asset case before the transfers in, I think, April 1st.

So I will require that the single-asset rules apply as to the six properties. Are you all in agreement as to what those six properties are? Okay. Good. And we will provide that all of the single-asset rules apply to them, and I think that they should be separately administered. I don't think we will need to file separate cases for them, but I think that, to be fair and to otherwise avoid what would be an avoidance or an abuse of the bankruptcy system, I think we have to apply the rules as if those cases were filed separately.

So I will say today that that will apply as to the - I guess the 362 parts, but I think we will also have to have separate accountings and probably separate voting and the other kind of things. We can deal with that as a final matter down the road but, just to give you some idea of where it is going to go, I think you are going to have to treat those things as

if they were separately filed.

You know, if you want to pursue, if Palmetto or anybody else wants to pursue the fraudulent transfer issue, I think we need to do that by adversary proceeding and we will deal with that as it comes up.

I am not sure as a practical matter that — well, I will let you all decide about that, but it would seem to me that you could — the banks could pursue that and win that issue and then just be faced with twelve new bankruptcy filings. So I will let you all think about the practical aspects of this. My intention is, though, is to try to administer the present case, as long as we have the present case, to try to administer it in such a way that it would be the same as if the cases had been filed as the LLC cases. Okay. I may change my mind about that but that is my current thinking.

Ms. Simpson.

MS. SIMPSON: As far as administration goes, then, could we have the debtors file supplemental schedules and statements for each of these six properties? Not necessarily amended but supplemental showing both the assets, the creditors, as well as the financial information contained in the statement of financial affairs?

THE COURT: If you all can do that, then I think it would probably be worthwhile to do it.

MR. PULLIAM: Your Honor, excuse me, I would think that

applies to all the LLCs, not just the six single-asset cases. The LLCs with - for example, one of the LLCs owned two projects. Each should be separate schedules and statement of affairs for those, as well, because I think the general thought process with respect to the single-asset cases applies across the board, not just the single asset. I understand the single-asset rules may only apply to the six, but -

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, sir.

MR. HOUSTON: Right, Your Honor, and I think, if you are going to apply them, I think it needs to apply to the six properties that would have been prepetition. I don't think that was necessarily before the court.

THE COURT: No, we won't apply the single-asset rules to the others but I think, in terms of laying out schedules, it would probably be a good idea to have just an amended set of schedules that shows what goes where with each entity.

MR. WRIGHT: But with regard to each preexisting SPE or with regard to those six?

THE COURT: No, all of them.

MR. WRIGHT: All of them?

THE COURT: All of them. Okay.

MR. ESSER: Your Honor, I think that that gives us a fairly good road map moving forward. The one issue which is somewhat left hanging out there is the issue of avoidance actions because, as a technical matter, if the various LLCs,

you know, transferred property in the ninety-day period or even in the fraudulent transfer look-back period, as a technical matter I am not sure that that's necessarily within the estate because those LLCs haven't filed and, if down the road we looked at it and one of these LLCs had done a big transfer, then the party coming in would say, well, it's not a transfer of property of the debtor, so that isn't the Farmers and therefore we have got a complete defense. It seems to me, Your Honor, there should be something structured to make sure that's brought in.

MR. PEARCE: Your Honor, that's a plan issue, it seems to me, and let's let the parties negotiate that.

THE COURT: Let me let you all think and talk about that before I haul off and do something because I can't begin to figure out what that might mean down the road as a practical matter to you all but you all talk about that and see where you come out with it, and we can deal with that sometime later.

MR. HOUSTON: I just have one housecleaning kind of aspect. The 341 meeting is next Friday, and I am not sure that that's even really possible for us to get schedules filed by then. Is there any objections to us rescheduling that and then having some kind of extension for us to get supplemental or amended schedules filed?

MS. SIMPSON: Typically you don't reschedule because we would have to re-notice everyone. We will go ahead and have it

24 and I have no objection, if creditors appear and they want to 1 ask questions, to ask what they want, and then we will continue 2 it over until schedules are filed. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 HOUSTON: At which time you would schedule an 5 additional or supplemental 341 meeting? 6 MS. SIMPSON: We don't schedule one. We just at the 7 meeting we continue it to a certain date forward, and that 8 avoids the cost of re-noticing everybody. 9 MR. HOUSTON: I think that works. I think we probably 10 need at least two weeks to get all of this stuff filed if there 11 is no objection to that. 12 THE COURT: That's fine. No, that's fine. Okay. Does 13 that take care of us, then, for today? 14 (Transcription stopped at 10:29:44 a.m.) 15

CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Patricia Basham

Patricia Basham, Transcriber

Date: August 25, 2010

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